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Abstract
 
This article examines the results from the first year (1998) of the Arizona
Education Tax Credit program. The tax credit law allows individuals a
dollar- for-dollar tax credit of $500 for donations to private schools and a
dollar-for-dollar tax credit of $200 for donations to public schools.
Although one justification for this statute was that it would help lower
income students, the primary beneficiaries of this program tend to be the
relatively well off. The author concludes that Arizona's tax credit law
increases educational funding inequity in Arizona. Data for 1999, only
recently made available, show a 159.1 percent increase in total
contributions and an exacerbation of the trends noted here.
This article is one of four on the Arizona Tax Credit Law:
Welner: Taxing the Establishment Clause
Moses: Hidden Considerations of Justice
Rud: Moral Considerations
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Introduction
        Education tax credits are a relatively new mechanism intended to promote and fund
school choice by means of the tax system. In Arizona's first regular legislative session in
1997, House Bill 2074 was passed and on April 7, 1997 was signed into law by Arizona
Governor Fife Symington as A.R.S. § 43-1089. Beginning with the 1998 tax year,
A.R.S. § 43-1089 created a private school tuition organization individual income tax
credit and a public school extracurricular activity fee individual income tax credit. 
        With the private school tax credit, Arizona taxpayers were granted a full and direct
credit against state income taxes for contributions up to $500 to school tuition
organizations (STOs). STOs then provide grants to students to attend private schools.
A.R.S. § 43-1089 contains very few restrictions as to how the proceeds from this tax
credit are to be used. The major restrictions are: that taxpayers claiming this credit may
not earmark their donation to their own dependents, that STOs allocate at least 90
percent of their annual revenue for "educational scholarships" or "tuition grants," and
that STOs provide scholarships or grants without limiting availability to only students of
one school (A.R.S. § 43-1089). 
        A similar $200 tax credit is also available for contributions to public schools;
however, these contributions may only be used for extracurricular activities that require
a student fee. Examples provided in the statute include: band uniforms, equipment or
uniforms for varsity athletic activities and scientific laboratory materials (A.R.S. §
43-1089.01). Originally, contributions to public schools did not qualify for this credit
because the legislative bill restricted the tax credit to "a nongovernmental primary or
secondary school" of the "parents' choice" [A.R.S. § 43-1089 (E) (1), (2)]. As a
compromise with opponents of the legislative bill, the law as finally enacted included a
$200 tax credit for contributions to K-12 public schools. 
        To tax professionals, provisions such as tax credits and tax deductions are known
as tax expenditures. Tax expenditures are special preferences embedded in the tax code
that are intended to benefit particular activities or groups. Tax expenditures cause a loss
of tax revenue and thus, are functionally equivalent to government spending programs.
Surrey and McDaniel (1985) stated the following about tax expenditures:
Whatever their form, these departures from the normative tax structure
represent government spending for favored activities or groups, effected
through the tax system rather than through direct grants, loans, or other
forms of governmental assistance….These tax expenditures in effect
represent monetary assistance provided by the government (p. 3).
It should be noted that unlike tax deductions allowed for general charitable giving,
Arizona's education tax credit provides a full reimbursement to those who contribute.
Thus, the tax credit plan does not function as a stimulus to charitable giving, but instead
functions to allow self-selected taxpayers to redirect funds, that would otherwise flow
into state accounts, to private entities of their own choosing. 
        A major justification for school choice programs has been to offer additional
educational alternatives to low-income families. The Arizona tax credit law was
promoted with a similar justification. The Arizona Republic, in a recent story on the tax
credit program reported that "Supporters of the credit for private school scholarships,
including Rep. Mark Anderson, R-Mesa, who sponsored the legislation, touted it as a
way to send kids to private school who otherwise couldn't afford to go" (Bland, 2000).
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Arizona Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas B. Zlaket offered similar reasoning in the
opinion upholding the school tax credit law. Zlaket wrote: "Until now, low-income
parents may have been coerced into accepting public education…Arizona's tax credit
achieves a higher degree of parity by making private schools more accessible and
providing alternatives to public education" [Kotterman v. Killian, No. CV-97-0412-SA
(1999)]. If such published accounts were accurate, it would appear that the primary
intended beneficiaries of the law could be construed as low-income students and their
families with a primary intended effect of increased educational choice (increased access
to private schooling). For public schools, the justification appears to be to assist parents
in paying for public school extracurricular activities. To extend the justification for the
private school tax credit to the extracurricular public school tax credit would logically
mean that the primary beneficiaries of the public school tax credit should be students
and families that face hardship in paying extracurricular fees. 
        However, to opponents, education tax credits are poor public policy and a
dangerous road on which to travel. In addition to fundamental constitutional questions of
separation of church and state, many critics believe that tax expenditures, such as tax
credits, tend to be highly inequitable. Wealthy individuals may be much more likely to
take advantage of them than lower-income individuals, who may not even earn enough
income to participate in the program. For example, Weinberg (1987) calculated that for
FY 1985, at least 50 percent of the total benefits provided by tax expenditures through
the U.S. individual income taxation system went to the top 20 percent of families (in
terms of income). The poorest 40 percent of families (by income) received less than 20
percent of the total benefits offered through tax expenditures. Under Arizona's plan,
those participating receive a full reimbursement of their contribution and thus, do not
actually incur any costs at all. Therefore, Arizona's plan appears to allow higher-income
individuals to direct a portion of state tax revenue to public or private schools while
possibly denying lower-income individuals an equal real opportunity to do the same.
Another objection to the use of tax credits relates to the distributional pattern that critics
believe will occur. Critics have charged that under this plan, resources will not flow to
where needs are the greatest—that in the end, this plan will be just another subsidy for
the middle-class.
Research Design
        The purpose of the quantitative analysis reported here is to describe the distribution
of tax credit contributions in terms of student poverty/wealth, contributor
poverty/wealth, enrollment and student achievement. Since the data in hand constitute a
full census of the education tax credit records for the 1998 tax year, no questions of
statistical inference arise. Rather, the purpose of the data analysis will be to show the
different levels of contributions in terms of different factors. 
Data Collection and Preparation 
        Complete records of all Calendar Year 1998 contributions (as of March 26, 1999)
under the education tax credit law were obtained from the Arizona Department of
Revenue (ADOR). Approximately 60,000 contributions were documented, accounting
for about $7.7 million dollars. The number of contributions and the total amount
contributed to the recipient school were provided; no taxpayer identification (neither
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personal identity, location nor income level) was included. The data contained listings
for 1,144 K-12 public schools. Data on public schools participating in the federal
free/reduced meal program (F/R meal) were obtained from the Arizona Department of
Education (ADE). The number of students eligible for the F/R meal program as well as
the total school enrollment were contained in the data from ADE. After combining the
two data records, there were 929 public schools (81.2% of the total) for which there was
data on both measures (tax credit contributions and F/R meal program). Schools for
which there was no tax credit contribution listing and/or no free/reduced meal program
data were not included in the analysis. For the public schools with data on the two
elements of interest, information as to the school's 1997-98 student performance on the
state-mandated Stanford-9 Achievement Test was added for each school. For elementary
schools, the 4th grade reading and math individual percentile ranks were used; for
middle/junior high schools, 7th grade reading and math individual percentile ranks were
employed; and for high schools, 9th grade reading and math individual percentile ranks
were used. If the particular score for a school was missing, the closest available score
was used. For example, if the 4th grade reading or math score was missing for an
elementary school, then the closest available score such as the 3rd grade score for that 
particular school was used. The reading and math individual percentile ranks were
summed and divided by 2 to provide a combined score for each school. The 929 public
schools in the dataset were placed into quarters based on the percentage of a school's
students eligible for F/R meal program. In this dataset, these percentages ranged from 1
to 100 percent of schools' enrollment. 
        The data on tax credit claimants (Tables 4 – 7) are based on ADOR's review of
individual tax returns. As of September 23, 1999, approximately 25,000 individual tax
returns have been reviewed. ADOR estimates that nearly 17,000 tax returns filed prior to
September 1, 1999 have yet to be reviewed. Any tax returns filed after September 1,
1999 and before the end of calendar year 1999 will also require review in order to have
complete first year results. The data concerning private schools and School Tuition
Organizations (table 8) were obtained from ADOR, the Center for Market-based
Education, and telephone calls to individual STOs. 
Findings: Public Schools 
        After the ADOR tax credit and ADE F/R Meal Program data records were
combined, there were 929 public schools enrolling 672,211 students, for which there
was data on both measures of interest (contributions under the tax credit program and
F/R meal program). Stanford Achievement Test data were then added to the dataset and
schools were arranged into quarters on the basis of relative poverty/wealth. Summary
tables were developed for several items of interest (school characteristics, school basis
contribution data and student basis contribution data). Characteristics of the schools in
the dataset are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1
Public School Characteristics
 All Poorest Second Second Wealthiest 
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Schools Quarter Poorest Quarter
Wealthiest 
Quarter Quarter
Number of Schools 929 232 232 233 232
School Enrollment 672,211 142,760 164,087 168,025 197,339
Percent of Total 
School Enrollment 100.0% 21.2% 24.4% 25.0% 29.4%
Mean School 
Enrollment 723.6 615.3 707.3 721.1 850.6 
Mean Percentage of 
Students Eligible for 
F/R Meal Program
51.2% 87.1% 63.3% 40.5% 14.0%
Mean Combined 
Reading/Math SAT-9 
Percentile Rank
Score
48.7 30.4 43.3 53.5 66.6
Sources: Arizona Department of Education and Arizona Department of Revenue
        Table 1 shows the extent of the differences in the poverty/wealth measure and
achievement measure between the quarters formed around relative poverty/wealth of the
schools. The mean percentage of students eligible for the F/R meal program represents
relative differences in poverty for a school's student body. The overall mean percentage
of students eligible for the F/R meal program was 51.2 percent with a standard deviation
of 28.01. When viewed by quarters based on poverty/wealth, the mean percentage of
students eligible for the F/R meal program ranged from 87.1 percent (SD = 6.94) in the
poorest quarter to 14.0 percent (SD = 7.36) in the wealthiest quarter. As for achievement
differences represented by Stanford-9 results, the mean combined reading/math
individual percentile rank score for all schools was slightly below midpoint at 48.7 (SD
= 18.75); for schools in the poorest quarter the score was 30.4 (SD = 11.85) and for the
wealthiest 25 percent of schools it was 66.5 (SD = 9.61). 
        Table 2 accounts for a total of $5,925,436 contributed to 929 public K-12 schools
from 53,294 separate donations. 163 schools (17.5%) did not receive any money under
this program. A comparison of the distribution of tax credit contributions between the
poorest and wealthiest quarters reveals that wealthy schools received a
disproportionately large number of donations as well as a disproportionately large
amount of the total resources that were distributed under this program. In terms of the
number of contributions, the wealthiest quarter of schools received 29,756 separate
donations, a mean of 128.3 (SD = 204.94) donations per school. The poorest quarter
received 4,097 separate donations, a mean of 17.7 (SD = 39.62) donations per school.
Thus, the wealthiest quarter received 55.8 percent of all contributions while the poorest
quarter accounted for 7.7 percent. This resulted in schools in the wealthiest quarter
receiving a mean amount of $13,448 (SD = $14,858) and the schools in the poorest
quarter receiving a mean amount of $2,859 (SD = $6,763). In the wealthiest group, 5
schools (2.2%) did not receive any money, while in the poorest quarter, 79 schools
(34.1%) did not receive any funds. Fully 52.7 percent of the amount contributed to
public schools went to the wealthiest 25 percent of schools while the poorest 25 percent
of schools received 11.2 percent. 
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Table 2
School Basis Contribution Data
 
All 
Schools
Poorest 
Quarter
Second 
Poorest 
Quarter
Second 
Wealthiest 
Quarter
Wealthiest 
Quarter
Amount 
Donated $5,925,436 $663,272 $782,417 $1,359,790 $3,119,958
Percent of 
Total Amount 
Donated
100.0% 11.2% 13.2% 22.9% 52.7%
Number of 
Donations 53,294 4,097 6,218 13,223 29,756
Percent of 
Total 
Donations
100.0% 7.7% 11.7% 24.8% 55.8%
Per School 
Donation $6,378.29 $2,858.93 $3,372.49 $5,836.01 $13,448.09
Sources: Arizona Department of Education and Arizona Department of Revenue
        A regression analysis was conducted to evaluate the relationship between the
dependent variable of donation amount to public schools and the independent variable of
percentage of a public school's students eligible for F/R meal program. A first-order
quadratic regression model provided the best fit between the independent and dependent
variables, R = .409, R2 = .167, Adjusted R2 = .165, F (2, 926) = 92.75, p < .001. The
beta weight for the independent variable was negative, indicating that schools with
higher percentages of students eligible for the F/R meal program (higher poverty) tended
to receive lower donation amounts through the tax credit program. 
        Table 3 presents tax credit donation data on a per student basis. A comparison of
the wealthiest quarter and the poorest quarter shows that the wealthiest quarter received
an average of $15.81 per enrolled student while the poorest quarter received an average
of $4.65, a difference of 70.6 percent. In the wealthiest quarter, there was 1 donation
received for every 6.6 enrolled students, compared with 1 donation received for every
34.8 enrolled students in the poorest quarter.
Table 3
Student Basis Contribution Data
 
All 
Schools
Poorest 
Quarter
Second 
Poorest 
Quarter
Second 
Wealthiest 
Quarter
Wealthiest 
Quarter
Per Student 
Donation $8.81 $4.65 $4.77 $8.09 $15.81
7 of 13
Number of 
Students Per 
Each Donation
12.6 34.8 26.4 12.7 6.6
Sources: Arizona Department of Education and Arizona Department of Revenue.
        Table 4 presents available data on the distribution of public school tax credits by
the claimant's federal adjusted gross income (FAGI). Placing the tax credit claimants
into groups based on their FAGI shows that the largest group of claimants (49. 2%), fall
into the $50,000 to $100,000 group. This group accounted for 49.1 percent of the total
credits for public schools. 
Table 4
Public School Tax Credit by Claimants' Federal Adjusted Gross
Income
 Total
$20,000 
or less 
FAGI
$20,000 
to 
$50,000 
FAGI
$50,000 to 
$100,000 
FAGI
$100,000 
to 
$500,000 
FAGI 
Over 
$500,000 
FAGI
Number of 
donations 16,930 389 3,999 8,322 4,100 120
Percentage 
of Total 
Donations
100.0% 2.3% 23.6% 49.2% 24.2% 0.7%
Total 
Credits $3,043,456 $65,887 $693,208 $1,493,354 $768,253 $22,754
Percentage 
of Total 
Credits
100.0% 2.2% 22.8% 49.1% 25.2% 0.7%
Average 
Size of 
Donation
$179.77 $169.38 $173.35 $179.45 $187.38 $189.62
Source: Arizona Department of Revenue (Data as of August 1999)
Findings: Private Schools 
        According to ADOR tax credit records, there were 15 STOs actively soliciting
donations in calendar year 1998. Of these 15 STOs, 10 were religiously affiliated, three
were nonreligious, one is of unknown status, and one is no longer active. The 15 STOs
reported receiving $1,815,799 from 4,246 separate donations. Table 5 shows the
distribution of donations by type of STO. Fully 95.3 percent of the funds donated went
to religiously oriented STOs. 
Table 5
Donation Data Reported by School Tuition Organizations (STOs)
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Total 
STOs
Religious 
affiliated 
STOs
Nonreligious 
STOs
STOs No longer 
active or of 
Unknown status
Number of STOs 15 10 3 2
Number of 
Donations 4,246 4,045 132 69
Amount Donated $1,815,799 $1,731,019 $54,805 $29,975
Percentage of 
Total Amount 
Donated
100.0% 95.3% 3.0% 1.7%
Source: Arizona Department of Revenue (Data as of August 1999)
        The U.S. Department of Education in the Digest of Education Statistics, 1999, 
estimates that in the fall of 1997 there were 44,991 students enrolled in private
elementary and secondary schools in Arizona. From the Fall of 1993 to the Fall of 1997,
there was an increase of 1,226 private school students for an average annual increase of
307 students. Applying this rate of increase to the Fall 1997 figures produces a Fall 1998
private school enrollment estimate of 45,298. Therefore, the average per student
donation for private schools is estimated to be approximately $40.09 (Table 6). 
Table 6
Estimated Per Student Basis Donation Data for Public and Private
Schools
Public Schools Private Schools
Per Student Donation $8.81 $40.09
Number of Students Per Each Donation 12.6 10.7
Sources: Digest of Education Statistics, 1999 and Arizona Department of Revenue
        For the first year of the tax credit, many STOs were reportedly reluctant to
distribute revenues for scholarships until the court challenges were decided (Meyer and
Smith, 1999). Seven STOs reported information about the amount and numbers of
scholarships given (one STO did not provide the number of scholarships given). These
data are summarized in Table 7. 
Table 7
Scholarship Data Reported by School Tuition Organizations (STOs)
STO Number of Donations
Total 
Amount
Average 
Scholarship 
Amount 
Arizona Scholarships and 
Tuition 42 $26,360 $627.62
Christian Scholarship Fund 
of Arizona 163 $68,235 $418.62
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Higher Education for 
Lutherans Program 116 $31,380 $270.52
Northern Arizona Christian 
School Scholarship 30 $35,000 $1,167.67
St. Gregory/Green Fields 
Scholarship 82 $32,480 $396.10
Southern Arizona 
Foundation for Education 56 $22,250 $397.32
Total 489 $215,705 $411.11
Source: Arizona Department of Revenue (Data as of August 1999)
        STO reports to ADOR indicated that 417 scholarships (85.3%) averaged below 500
dollars, with 42 (8.6%) between $500 and $1,000 and 30 (6.1%) above $1,000. The low
scholarship award amounts suggests that the tax credit is functioning more as a middle
class subsidy rather than offering increased access for low income students. Low-income
families would likely continue to find it financially difficult to enroll their children in
private schools with such low scholarship assistance. 
        Similar to Table 4 for public schools, Table 8 presents available data on the
distribution of tax credits by the claimant's federal adjusted gross income (FAGI), but
this time for private schools. Placing the tax credit claimants into groups based on their
FAGI shows that the largest group of claimants (40.9%), fall into the $50,000 to
$100,000 group. The median FAGI for the $50,000 to $100,000 group was slightly over
$70,000. This group claimed 41.7 percent of the total credits for public schools claimed. 
Table 8
Private School Tax Credit by Claimants' Federal Adjusted Gross
Income (FAGI)
 Total
$20,000 
or less 
FAGI
$20,000 to 
$50,000 
FAGI
$50,000 to 
$100,000 
FAGI
$100,000 
to 
$500,000 
FAGI 
Over 
$500,000 
FAGI
Number of 
donations 2,579 52 492 1,055 906 74
Percentage 
of Total 
Donations
100.0% 2.0% 19.1% 40.9% 35.1% 2.9%
Total 
Credits $1,133,636 $14,311 $187,130 $472,345 $424,500 $35,350
Percentage 
of Total 
Credits
100.0% 1.3% 16.5% 41.7% 37.4% 3.1% 
Average 
Size of 
Donation
$439.56 $275.21 $380.35 $447.72 $468.54 $477.70
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Source: Arizona Department of Revenue (Data as of August 1999)
        Compared with public schools, the results for private schools were somewhat more
skewed toward the wealthy, with those in the $100,000 to $500,000 FAGI group
accounting for 37.4 percent of the STO credits versus 25.2 percent of the public school
credits. 
Conclusion
        Arizona's education tax credit law results in serious inequities in who has access to
this credit, and who receives the proceeds. The strongest argument and major
justification for this tax credit program was that it would benefit lower income students
and offer them increased access to private schooling. Overall, the evidence strongly
suggests that lower income students are not benefiting from this program. In public
schools, the schools with wealthier families and higher standardized test scores are
receiving most of the proceeds from this program while schools with students from
poorer families and lower test scores are receiving much less. According to the analysis,
52.7 percent of the total amount contributed went to the wealthiest 25 percent of schools
while the poorest 25 percent of schools received 11.2 percent. The average STO
scholarship award amount was $411.11, which tends to cast doubt that such scholarships
are enabling many low- income students to begin attending private schools. 
        The evidence also suggests inequity in who has access to this tax credit. The data
showed that 75.1 percent of the public school portion of tax credits provided through the
education tax credit program went to donators with federal adjusted gross income of
$50,000 or more. For private school donations, the results were even more highly
skewed toward the wealthy. For private school donators, 82.2 percent of the tax credits
claimed went to those with federal adjusted gross income of $50,000 or more. 
        The tax credit for school tuition organizations that provide scholarships for students
attending private or religious schools is almost solely benefiting religiously oriented
schools. The data shows that 95.3 percent of all private tax credit donations went to
religiously oriented school tuition organizations. 
        Data for the second year of the Arizona's Education Tax Credit program, only
recently made available, show a 60.4 percent increase in public school donations and a
633.3 percent increase in private school donations over the prior year's results.
Preliminary indications are that the second year data shows an exacerbation of the trends
noted in the first year data (Bland, 2000). 
        Overall, the evidence from this analysis indicates that students from wealthier
families and wealthier donators are the primary beneficiaries of this tax credit statute,
rather than low-income students and families. This tax credit has functioned to increase
the funding inequity which was already a problem and source of contention in Arizona's
school system.
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